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In the past few years, YouTube and other sites for sharing video files over the Internet have vaulted
from obscurity to places of centrality in the media landscape. The files available at YouTube include
a mix of user-generated video and clips from network television shows.  Networks fear that availability
of their clips on YouTube will depress television viewing. But unauthorized clips are also free advertising
for television shows.  As YouTube has grown quickly, major networks have responded by making
their content available at their own sites. This paper examines the effects of authorized and unauthorized
web distribution on television viewing between 2005 and 2007 using a survey of Penn students on
their tendencies to watch television series on television as well as on the web. The results provide
a glimpse of the way young, Internet-connected people use YouTube and related sites.  While I find
some evidence of substitution of web viewing for conventional television viewing, time spent viewing
programming on the web -- 4 hours per week -- far exceeds the reduction in weekly traditional television
viewing of about 25 minutes.  Overall time spent on network-controlled viewing (television plus network
websites) increased by 1.5 hours per week.
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In the past few years, YouTube and other sites for sharing video files over the 
Internet have vaulted from obscurity to places of centrality in the media landscape.  
YouTube allows users to post video files up to 10 minutes in length or 100 megabytes in 
size available to anyone at any time.  Founded in February 2005, YouTube was named 
Time Magazine’s Invention of the Year for 2006 and is now among the top 10 sites on the 
Internet.   
The files available at YouTube include a mix of user-generated video and clips 
from network or studio-created fare.  Networks fear that users will view clips on 
YouTube instead of watching through conventional channels, depressing television 
viewing.  But YouTube might instead help them.  Unauthorized clips are, in one sense, 
free advertising for television shows. Given the serial nature of television programming, 
with episodes as complements for one another, the availability of easily accessible clips 
online could stimulate conventional television viewing. 
Another possible effect of unauthorized web distribution is also benign for 
networks: those viewing material on YouTube might otherwise not have watched 
television.  While their viewership of unauthorized files might not simulate conventional 
viewership, it may represent a gain to consumers without offsetting losses to the content 
creators. 
As YouTube has grown quickly, major networks have responded by making their 
content available at authorized online sites.  As of July 10, 2007, abc.com offered full 
episodes of about 20 series.  Four recently-aired episodes of Grey’s Anatomy are 
available as are four episodes of Lost.  CBS, NBC, Fox, and Comedy Central also offer 
their shows online.  Network sites differ from unauthorized sites in that they offer full   2
episodes rather than the excerpts available at, say, YouTube.  The network web offerings 
also include advertising. 
The possibility that content available on the web may either stimulate or depress 
television viewing is by now familiar from the debates over the effect of file sharing in 
music and movies.
1  Here, as in the examples of music and movies, the question of 
whether authorized or unauthorized web distribution stimulates or cannibalizes 
conventional television consumption is an empirical one.  The serial nature of television 
programming – and the attendant complementarity across episodes of a series – give the 
suggestion that web distribution stimulates television viewing a veneer of plausibility. 
To measure such effects, I have undertaken a survey, asking students on a college 
campus about their habits in viewing television as well as video on the web.  The results 
of the survey provide a glimpse of the way young, Internet-connected people use 
YouTube and related sites.  I am able to provide answers to the following questions: 
1)  What unauthorized and authorized sites do people use for video? 
2)  How much time they spend watching various forms of web video and 
traditional television? 
3)  Which shows are most commonly viewed on the web as opposed to on 
television? 
4)  Do authorized and unauthorized web video use displace conventional 
television use? 
The question of whether YouTube stimulates or cannibalizes interest in 
conventional television viewing gained additional prominence in March of 2007 when 
                                                 
1 See Liebowitz (2006), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), Rob and Waldfogel (2006, forthcoming), 
Zentner (2006).   3
Viacom sued Google (YouTube’s parent) for $1 billion dollars in damages.  According to 
Viacom’s complaint, 100,000 of its clips were available at YouTube, and users had 
viewed these clips 1.5 billion times (see Helft and Fabrikant, 2007).   In its filing Viacom 
charged that the “recent $1.65 billion acquisition price for YouTube reflects the website’s 
enormous popularity. YouTube’s value, however, is built largely on the unauthorized 
appropriation and exploitation of copyrighted works belonging to others, especially 
Plaintiffs. As a result, a large part of YouTube’s value is directly attributable to the 
availability of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works on YouTube’s website.”
2  The damages that 
Viacom suggests in its complaint depend on whether clips viewed at YouTube 
cannibalize or stimulate authorized viewing of Viacom’s properties.  
This paper proceeds in three sections.  Section 1 provides context and theoretical 
background.  Section 2 describes the underlying survey and the resulting data used in the 
study.  Section 3 presents results.  A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I. Context and Theoretical Background 
YouTube was founded in February 2005 and has grown very rapidly.   Ranked by 
daily traffic from Alexa.com users, YouTube grew from obscurity – a rank of roughly 
100,000
th – in mid 2005 to nearly the top 100 by the start of 2006 (Figure 1).
3  Between 
January 2006 and July 2006, monthly unique audience grew from 4.9 million to 19.6 
million visitors, according to Nielsen.
4  Time Magazine named YouTube the Best 
                                                 
2 See Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube and Google Inc., COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES, accessed at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/vvg.pdf, July 9, 
2007. 
3 Alexa.com provides a time series on the use of YouTube (and many other sites), compiled from users of 
their toolbar, and they make these statistics available at Alexa.com.   
4See http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr_060721_2.pdf , accessed July 10, 2007   4
Invention of 2006 in November 2006.
5  By late 2006 YouTube was in the top 10, where it 
has remained through mid 2007.   According to Alexa.com, YouTube was the 5
th most 
popular site on the web on July 10, 2007.
6 
  Apart from filing the lawsuit described in the introduction, the networks have 
responded to YouTube’s emergence mainly by making their programming available 
online in various authorized forms.  In late 2005 ABC and then NBC began selling 
episodes of popular shows on iTunes (Pennington, 2006).  In early 2006 CBS began to 
offer episodes of its popular shows for sale at Google’s Video Store (Mills, 2006).  Even 
as they were trying to sell episodes online, they were also experimenting with free 
authorized distribution.  Late in 2005, networks experimented with free streaming content 
at their websites.  CBS “streamed episodes of “Two and a Half Men” and “How I Met 
Your Mother” on Yahoo!” during a “Christmas break experiment” that “increased 
viewership for the two shows on the network,” according to CBS Entertainment President 
Nina Tassler (Pennington, 2006).   
A few months later the networks changed their strategies, making programming 
available for streaming free online (Grand Rapids Press, 2006).  In May 2006, ABC 
became the first network to offer full-length episodes online (Petrecca, 2006).  By the fall 
of 2006 - with the dawn of the 2006-2007 television season – all of the major networks 
were offering multiple shows online without charge (Zap2It.com, 2006).  Many observers 
                                                 
5See http://www.time.com/time/2006/techguide/bestinventions/inventions/youtube.html. 
6 See http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?cc=US&ts_mode=country&lang=none, accessed July 10, 
2007.   5
viewed this strategy as a “response to the popularity of digital recording devices and 
piracy issues that major network broadcasters are facing.”
7 
The rapid growth of both authorized and unauthorized distribution of network’s 
video content on the web between 2005 and 2007 makes this period an auspicious one for 
documenting effects of web distribution on viewership of network content on television 
viewing. The growth in programming viewed on the web in this period reflects newly 
available supply and is exogenous to the users.  The changes in the environment over this 
period subject intense web users – such as on-campus college students – to a natural 
experiment:  What happens to conventional television viewing of people who are now 
able to view clips or shows at various authorized or unauthorized websites? 
Video obtained over YouTube differs from music or movie file sharing in that 
YouTube literally provides excerpts, while music and movie file sharing typically 
provide an unauthorized user with a complete copy of the file in question.  While a music 
downloader might be moved by his conscience to purchase a legal copy of a song, he gets 
very little direct benefit from making this purchase once he has downloaded a copy.  
Similarly, because most movie file sharing is done via copied DVDs, the possessor of a 
pirated copy has little to gain, save perhaps a salved conscience, from purchasing a movie 
he has already obtained without payment. 
Here, though, some of the video available for viewing on the web is of poor 
quality by design.  YouTube hosts video, and the clips are no more than ten minutes or 
                                                 
7 See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Broadcasting_Company, accessed July 10, 2007. 
   6
100 megabytes in length.
8  The video of television content at network websites is of 
higher quality, but like the unauthorized videos at YouTube, it is streamed and can only 
be watched on a computer.  Perhaps more important than their poor quality, episodes can 
serve as complements for one another: watching one episode or excerpt online can 
elevate a viewer’s interest in seeing other episodes through authorized channels (on 
television or at a network website).
9  Hence, it is far more plausible – here than in music 
or movies – to suppose that web distribution use might stimulate demand for 
conventional or authorized television viewing. 
Even if web distribution use does not stimulate conventional television viewing, 
there is reason to think - more than in music or movies – that web distribution use would 
not displace conventional television viewing.  Unauthorized web distribution allows users 
to time-shift their video viewing even if they lack a digital video recorder or VCR.  
Moreoever, web distribution allows viewing on a computer rather than a television. Thus 
it allows viewing by people unavailable when programming is aired as well as people 
without ready access to a television set.    
The question of whether web distribution stimulates or depresses conventional 
television viewing has two parts, both of which may be analyzed with a simple demand 
curve.  First, there is the question of whether the viewing on the web would otherwise 
have occurred if viewers only had access to conventional television.  Consider the 
demand curve in Figure 1 that shows potential viewers’ willingness to “pay” to view 
programming over conventional television.  The price here is largely metaphoric given 
that programming is mostly free, at least at the margin.  For our purposes, the price 
                                                 
8 See http://www.youtube.com/my_videos_upload, accessed July 9, 2007 
9 This observation has multiple theoretical antecedents, including Shapiro and Varian (1999), Varian 
(2000), and Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999).   7
consists of the willingness to watch commercials and viewers’ ability to schedule their 
lives to be available when programming is broadcast. 
Prior to the availability of web distribution, viewers watch q0 shows, enjoying 
some consumer surplus of CS while networks get revenue proportional to REV.
10  There 
is also some deadweight loss (DWL), in that some programming would be watched if 
viewers could time-shift and/or avoid commercials. 
The effect of web availability depends on whether users watch programming they 
would already have watched (i.e. if their valuations exceed the “price”).  If viewers watch 
on the web in instances in which their valuations exceed the price, web distribution will 
cannibalize conventional viewing.  On the other hand, if web viewings is drawn from the 
region of the viewer demand curve where valuations fall short of the price p0, then web 
distribution will raise consumption without reducing television viewing. 
Because of the serial nature of many programs, watching an episode (or an 
excerpt) on the web can stimulate interest in watching other episodes of the same show 
on television.  This shifts the demand curve out, perhaps raising the number of instances 
in which people “pay” for conventional television.  The higher valuation function raises 
the number of instances in which consumers would be willing to watch television, but 
because they have the option of viewing on the web instead, it’s not clear whether 
television viewing will rise.  The availability of programming on the web has a 
theoretically ambiguous effect on the use of conventional television.  
 
                                                 
10 The revenue received by networks is not literally the region REVdepicted in Figure 1.  Instead, it is a 
rectangle that equals the product of q0 and the price per viewer for advertising, which is generally not equal 
to the value of the programming to the viewer.   8
II. Data 
The data for this study come from a survey administered on the campus of the 
University of Pennsylvania in May 2007.  The survey was given to 287 persons on 
campus, who were asked about their use of television and the web for viewing television 
programming.  
They were asked how often they watch video over the web, which authorized (e.g. 
abc.com) and unauthorized (e.g. YouTube) video sites they use, how many weekly hours  
they spent watching conventional television, video at authorized websites, and video at 
unauthorized websites during the 2006-07 television season.  I also asked them to 
indicate which shows they watched.  For each series they indicated viewing mode (on 
television, authorized web sites, unauthorized web sites) and frequency (watched through 
that mode sometimes or frequently).  I asked for this series-level enumeration for both the 
2006-07 season just ending as well as for the previous television season (2005-06). 
The resulting data include the numbers of shows that respondents frequently or 
sometimes watch via one of three modes: on television, on the web via authorized sites 
(such as abc.com), or unauthorized for both the 2006-07 season and the preceding 2005-
06 season. 
  Respondents listed up to six sites that they use to view television programming.  
YouTube was by far the most common response: 244 of 283 respondents listed YouTube 
first.  Other unauthorized sites mentioned repeatedly include tv-links.co.uk, peekvid.com, 
and bittorrent.  Authorized sites, including abc.com, nbc.com, fox.com, cbs.com, and 
cnn.com, are also mentioned frequently.    9
  Which shows do people watch on which media?  The shows most frequently 
viewed on television include Grey’s Anatomy, Entourage, and The Daily Show.   The 
shows most frequently viewed via authorized web sites include Grey’s Anatomy, Lost, 
and The Daily Show.  The shows most frequently viewed unauthorized on the web 
include The Daily Show, South Park, and Scrubs.   
  In both seasons, traditional television remains the most popular method of 
viewing television content.  Respondents report spending a mean (median) of 4.5 (3) 
hours watching conventional television per week, compared with 3.8 (1) hours of 
authorized web video and 3.0 (1) hour of unauthorized web video, during the 2006-07 
television season.
11  The numbers of series watched via each medium mirror the hours 
breakdowns.  Table 1 reports the number of shows viewed either frequently or sometimes 
via each of the three modes during the two seasons.  Of 223 persons with valid data for 
both seasons, respondents watched an average of 2.62 series on television (either 
sometimes or frequently) during the 2005-06 season, compared with 0.48 shows at 
authorized web sites and 0.53 at unauthorized web sites. 
  Between the two seasons, however, growth in viewing via the web far outstripped 
growth in television viewing (see Table 1).   The number of series (sometimes or 
frequently) viewed unauthorized on the web grew by 96 percent, and authorized web 
viewing grew even more, by 188 percent.  Over the same period, the number of series 
viewed on conventional television in the sample grew by only 11 percent.  The sharp 
growth in web viewing between the 2005-06 and 2006-07 seasons among survey 
respondents reflects the overall growth in YouTube and network-authorized web 
distribution over this period detailed above. 
                                                 
11 The survey asked about weekly viewing hours only for the most recent (2006-07) season.   10
  During the 2006-07 season, television accounted for 72 percent of series that 
respondents viewed (sometimes or frequently), and this share fell to 55 percent in the 
following season.  In this sample nearly half of series viewed are viewed via the web in 
the second season.  This change in the use of the web is an important source of variation I 
will use to measure the impact of web distribution on conventional television viewing. 
  ABC, FOX, and NBC are the most watched networks in the 2005-06 season 
among the survey respondents.  For every network TV viewing is more prevalent than 
either authorized or unauthorized web distribution.  In the later season ABC, FOX, and 
NBC remain the most watched on television among these respondents.  Authorized web 
viewing rises sharply across the board and most sharply at ABC where respondents watch 
as many series on abc.com as on television.  
  The rapid growth of authorized web viewing in the sample suggests that the 
networks have been successful at undermining the relative appeal of unauthorized 
distribution.  This should not be too surprising given the quality of the viewing 
experience at, say, abc.com in contrast to YouTube.  Abc.com offers full episodes with 
high picture quality, albeit with some commercials, while unauthorized sites either stream 
with low resolution (e.g. YouTube) or – for sites used less frequently for viewing 
television programs – require actual downloading (e.g. BitTorrent). 
 
III.  Empirical Strategy and Results 
We have two broad strategies for determining whether the use of new modes of 
distribution displaces traditional television viewing.
12  First, we can ask whether those 
who watch more web video watch less television, for example using the measures of 
                                                 
12 These strategies mirror those adopted in Rob and Waldfogel (2006, forthcoming).   11
hours spent during the 2006-07 television season.  An obvious shortcoming with this 
approach is that those who watch a lot of television series on one outlet may watch a lot 
on the other simply because they like television series, rather than because one 
complements or stimulates the other.   
Still, it’s worth looking at simple statistics: The raw correlation of weekly hours 
spent watching television and authorized web video in 2006-07 is 0.07, and the 
correlation of television hours with hours spend watching unauthorized web video is 0.11 
(in both cases insignificantly different from zero).  The data on series rather than hours 
reveal similarly non-negative relationships among viewing by different modes.  
Aggregating the number of series viewed sometimes and those viewed frequently, TV 
and authorized web viewing are significantly positively related in both seasons, as are 
authorized and unauthorized web series viewing in 2005-06.  That is, people watching 
more series on television also watch more at authorized web sites.  In the earlier season, 
people watching more series at authorized web sites also watched more at unauthorized 
sites.  The positive relationships between viewing via different modes are consistent with 
unobserved heterogeneity (people who like television shows enjoy them via multiple 
media) but could also reflect complementary between viewing among different modes. 
 Distinguishing intense from casual use – series viewed frequently from those 
viewed only sometimes – via each mode produces somewhat different results.  While 
many correlations remain positive – between the number of series viewed on TV 
frequently and the number sometimes viewed via authorized web sites, between 
sometimes authorized and frequent television, between sometimes authorized and 
sometimes unauthorized – others are significantly negative, notably the relationship   12
between the number of series frequently viewed via unauthorized channels and the 
number viewed on television. Given the looming concern of unobserved heterogeneity in 
this context, these negative correlations provide interesting suggestive evidence of 
substitution. 
1. Cross Sectional Approach 
Regressions provide a more systematic way of analyzing these data, via the 
following statistical model: 
, 2 1 i i i i i WS WF X TV ε α α β + + + = where (suppressing the individual’s subscript) 
TV = number of series watched (sometimes or frequently) on conventional 
television during a season, 
WF = number of series watched frequently at authorized or unauthorized web 
sites, 
WS = number of series watched sometimes at authorized or unauthorized web 
sites, 
X = characteristics of the respondent (age, gender, etc.), and  
ε = unobserved determinant’s of the respondents’ television viewing. 
In this model the unobserved heterogeneity problem is the concern is that ε is correlated 
with AU and UN, for example because of unobserved tastes for television viewing. 
  We can decompose TV into the separate numbers of series watched frequently 
(TVF) and sometimes (TVS), where TV = TVF + TVS. We can also disaggregate frequent 
and sometime web viewing into authorized and unauthorized components: 
i i i AUF UNF WF + = , and    13
i i i AUS UNS WS + = , where the prefixes “UN” and “AU” refer to unauthorized and 
authorized viewing. Then we can also estimate a more flexible set of models: 
, 4 3 2 1
F
i i i i i
F
i i AUS AUF UNS UNF X TVF ε λ λ λ λ β + + + + + = and 
S
i i i i i
S
i i AUS AUF UNS UNF X TVS ε θ θ θ θ β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 . 
This allows frequent and casual viewing over the web to bear different relationships to 
the numbers of series viewed frequently, and casually, on television.  Moreover, it allows 
us to distinguish effects of authorized and unauthorized web distribution on television. 
  Table 2 presents regressions of the numbers of television series watched, either 
sometimes or frequently, on television viewing on age, gender, and measures of the 
numbers of series watched on authorized and unauthorized web sites for the 2005-06 
season.  The dependent variable in the first column aggregates both series watched 
frequently and sometimes on television in the 2005-06 season. The number of series 
watched on television bears a negative and significant relationship to the number of series 
viewed on the web (-0.34) and a positive and significant relationship to the number 
viewed sometimes on the web (0.39).  The next two columns examine the two constituent 
parts of the total number of series viewed on television, those viewed frequently (TVF) 
and those viewed sometimes (TVS).  For the 2005-06 season, web viewings’ relationships 
with total series watched operate largely through relationships with the number of series 
watched frequently on television: the coefficients in column (2) are large and significant, 
while the coefficients in column (3) are indistinguishable from zero.  
The latter half of Table 2 repeats the exercise of the first three columns with 
independent variables disaggregated to allow different coefficients on authorized and 
unauthorized web viewing. While significance levels decline, we cannot reject the   14
hypotheses of coefficients on authorized and unauthorized web viewing, equation by 
equation. 
Table 3 repeats the exercise of Table 2 for the latter (2006-07) season.  The first 
column’s frequent web viewing coefficient in the total series television viewing equation, 
-0.34 in the previous season, is now -0.10 and insignificant.  The sometime web viewing 
coefficient in the same equation rises from 0.39 in the previous season to 0.48.  In the 
latter season, frequent and sometime web viewing continue to have significant positive 
and negative coefficients, respectively, in explaining frequent television viewing (col 2), 
but both frequent and sometime web viewing have statistically significant coefficients in 
explaining sometime television viewing (col 3). 
Disaggregating web viewing into authorized and unauthorized yields somewhat 
different results for 2006-07 relative to the previous season. While authorized and 
unauthorized web distribution had statistically indistinguishable coefficients in the earlier 
season, in 2006-07 unauthorized distribution measures have consistently more negative 
or less positive coefficients in explaining total and frequent television viewing. 
The cross sectional results contain distinctive positive and negative coefficients.  
Given the underlying concern that unobserved heterogeneity would induce positive 
relationships, it is difficult to interpret the positive coefficients as evidence of 
complementarity.  Still, two results are interesting.  First, the negative coefficients in 
Tables 2 and 3 are more convincingly suggestive of substitution. Second, the distinctions 
between apparent effects of authorized and unauthorized web distribution in the latter 
season suggest that unauthorized distribution exerts a larger substituting effect. 
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2. Longitudinal Approach 
A second approach is to use the variation across individuals in the change over 
time in their web and television video use.  That is, we can estimate the model: 
is is is is WS WF TV ε α α α + Δ + Δ + = Δ 2 1 0  (or its analogues that disaggregate frequent and 
casual viewing), where variables are defined as above except that an observation is 
corresponds to a season (s).  This model “differences out” the unobservable person effect 
in conventional television viewing that is potentially correlated with viewing at 
authorized and unauthorized websites. 
The modeling approach asks whether those with larger growth in viewing of 
television series at either authorized or unauthorized sites experience larger decreases – 
or smaller increases – in television use.  Figure 3 plots the inter-season change in the 
number of series watched frequently on television (on the vertical axis) against that 
change in the number of series viewed frequently at unauthorized web sites (on the 
horizontal axis).  A negative relationship is evident.  The correlation is -0.18 and 
statistically significantly negative.  Figure 4 repeats the exercise replacing unauthorized 
with frequent authorized website viewing on the horizontal axis.  Again, a negative 
relationship is evident.  The correlation is -0.17 and significant.  Both frequent authorized 
and frequent unauthorized series viewing on the web bear significant negative 
relationships with the number of series viewed frequently on conventional television. 
Table 4 reports regressions of the change in series watched on television on 
changes in series viewed on the web.  The table has the same organization as Tables 2 
and 3, although variables are now in changes rather than levels.  The dependent variable 
in the first and second columns is the combined number of series watched sometimes or   16
frequently on television.  Column (1) presents a regression of the change in the number of 
series watched on television on the change in the numbers of series viewed frequently 
and sometimes on the web.  Neither frequent nor sometime web viewing has a significant 
coefficient, although the sometime coefficient (0.17) is nearly twice its standard error.  In 
column (2) explaining the change in series watched frequently on television, frequent 
web viewing gets a negative (-0.31) and significant coefficient that is similar to its cross 
section analogues (-0.3 to -0.4), while sometime web viewing gets an insignificant 
coefficient that contrasts with its positive and significant cross sections analogues (0.3).  
In column (3) explaining the change in series watched sometimes on television both 
frequent and sometime web viewing measures have positive and significant coefficients 
similar to their cross sectional analogues, particularly those for 2006-07. 
The latter half of the table allows authorized and unauthorized web viewing to 
have different coefficients.  For the most part, authorized and unauthorized web viewing 
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable, but while unauthorized web series viewing 
bears no relationship to sometime television viewing, authorized web viewing has a 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.30. 
An additional series viewed frequently via unauthorized and authorized web 
channels reduces the number of series viewed frequently on television but increases the 
number of shows viewed sometimes on television.  Evaluating equations (2) and (3) from 
Table 4 at the mean values of frequent and sometimes web viewing in the latter season, 
reduces the number of series viewed frequently on television (TVF) by 0.36, while they 
increase the number of series viewed sometimes on television (TVS) by 0.55.   17
Determining the overall effect of the web viewing on conventional television 
requires a way of comparing the amount of viewing associated with series viewed 
“frequently” and “sometimes.”  Because we have data on the number of hours 
respondents spend in all three modes of viewing in the second season, we can run a 
regression of, say, weekly hours of conventional television viewing on the numbers of 
series watched frequently and sometimes, respectively.  That is, we can run the 
regression: 
. 2 1 0 i i i i TVS TVF TVHours ε π π π + + + =  
The coefficients π1 and π2 from this regression map sometime and frequent television 
viewing of series into weekly hours.  They have the interpretation that each additional 
series viewed frequently adds π1 hours to weekly television viewing while each additional 
series viewed sometimes adds π2 hours to weekly viewing. 
Table 5 presents results.  The first two columns report a linear regression and a 
median regression, respectively, for television.  The next 2 columns repeat the exercise 
for authorized web viewing, and the final two columns for unauthorized web viewing.  
The first column indicates that an additional sometimes-watched series adds about half an 
hour to weekly television viewing, while an additional frequently-watched series adds 
over twice as much.  The latter number is difficult to take literally, since few programs 
are broadcast for over an hour per week.  Still, it is comforting that the frequently 
coefficient exceeds the sometimes coefficient. 
  The overall effect on television hours can then be estimated as 
TVS TVF TVHours Δ + Δ = Δ 2 1 π π .     18
Using the mean estimates of  π1 and π2  from column 1, the answer is a quarter of an hour 
(-0.24), which is 5 percent of the mean value of TV hours, 4.53 hours.  Thus, web 
distribution has on balance, reduced television viewing hours in this sample by 5 percent.  
Separating the effects of authorized and unauthorized web distribution, unauthorized 
accounts for 69 percent of the reduction.  
  While television hours decline slightly, total hours viewing network video content 
rise overall because of the series viewing at authorized and unauthorized web sites.  We 
can use the hours regressions in the remainder of Table 5 to calculate the additional hours 
of associated with the authorized and unauthorized web viewing in the 2006-07 season.  
Additional hours of weekly viewing of authorized web video are 1.78, 
13 while the 
change in unauthorized web viewing hours is 2.26 hours per week.  Thus, overall web 
viewing rises by 4.04 hours per week, far offsetting the 0.24 hour reduction in weekly 
television viewing in the sample.  Hours of network-controlled viewing rise by 1.54 per 
week (a 1.78 hour increase in network authorized web viewing in conjunction with a 0.24 
hours reduction in traditional television viewing). 
Much of these respondents’ viewing would not have occurred absent web 
distribution.  Using the demand framework introduced earlier, the additional consumption 
represents some combination of reduced deadweight loss of traditional distribution and 
demand stimulation effected by web distribution. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
13 This is calculated as  = + 07 / 06 2 07 / 06 1 AUS AUF
AU AU π π  2.14(0.57)+0.68(0.82).   19
The empirical literature on file sharing in music and movies has, for the most part, 
found depressing effects of web distribution on legal sales.  We too find significant 
depressing effects of web distribution on conventional television viewing, but we also 
document largely offsetting positive relationships, reflecting complementarity. 
Overall, conventional television viewing is reduced slightly in this sample, while 
overall viewing of network programming rises substantially.  Hours spent viewing 
television programming overall nearly double with web distribution.  While conventional 
television viewing falls by about 5 percent, this is more than offset by increases in time 
spent viewing network-authorized web programming. 
The networks’ own web distribution has smaller but similar effects as the 
unauthorized distribution on conventional television viewing.  Of course, in the network 
efforts, the network broadcasts advertising, so the loss the traditional viewing is at least 
partially offset by online ad revenue. 
This study has examined the relationship between web viewing and conventional 
television viewing for a small group of media users on a college campus.  This is a good 
population for study, given its intense computer use.  Relationships documented in this 
sample may offer a glimpse of relationships that will hold for a more general population 
as broadband continues to spread.  But it bears repeating that this sample is not 
representative of the US population generally.  Wider-scale sampling would be very 
useful for determining typical effects of web distribution of television programming on 
television viewing.    
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 Table 1: Series Viewed, by Network, Mode and Season 
   web  web 
2005-06 TV  authorized  unauthorized 
ABC 0.49  0.19  0.06 
CBS 0.05  0  0 
Comedy Central  0.26  0.09  0.09 
FOX 0.44  0.03  0.12 
NBC 0.3  0.03  0.05 
Other 1.13  0.14  0.22 
total 2.67  0.48  0.54 
      
   web  web 
2006-07 TV  authorized  unauthorized 
ABC 0.61  0.61  0.09 
CBS 0.05  0.02  0 
Comedy Central  0.28  0.18  0.17 
FOX 0.38  0.12  0.22 
NBC 0.35  0.13  0.19 
Other 1.29  0.32  0.39 
total 2.96  1.38  1.06 
      
   web  web 
% change  TV  authorized  unauthorized 
ABC 24%  221%  50% 
CBS 0%     
Comedy Central  8%  100%  89% 
FOX -14%  300%  83% 
NBC 17%  333%  280% 
Other 14%  129%  77% 
total 11%  188%  96% 
Note: number of series viewed here includes both those that respondents  
watch frequently and those that respondents watch sometimes.  22
 Table 2: Web Viewing and Television Viewing in the 2005-06 Season 
























Freq'ly on Web -’05-’06  -0.3397  -0.4214  0.0817       
  (0.1485)*  (0.1459)**  (0.1030)     
Sometimes on Web – ’05-’06  0.3926  0.2849  0.1077       
  (0.0985)**  (0.0968)**  (0.0683)     
Freq'ly Unauth'd ’05-’06        -0.3364  -0.4208  0.0844 
      (0.1778)  (0.1744)*  (0.1234) 
Freq'ly  Auth'd  ’05-’06      -0.3325  -0.4009  0.0683 
      (0.2572)  (0.2522)  (0.1784) 
Sometimes  Unauth'd  ’05-’06      0.2893  0.1258  0.1635 
      (0.1782)  (0.1748)  (0.1236) 
Sometimes Auth'd ’05-’06        0.4728  0.4084  0.0644 
      (0.1517)**  (0.1488)**  (0.1052) 
male  0.1412 0.1361 0.0051 0.1694 0.1802 -0.0107 
  (0.2391) (0.2349) (0.1658) (0.2438) (0.2391) (0.1691) 
age  0.0067 -0.0130 0.0197 0.0050 -0.0156 0.0207 
  (0.0305) (0.0299) (0.0211) (0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0213) 
Constant  2.2787 1.9142 0.3645 2.3038 1.9533 0.3505 
 (0.6526)**  (0.6411)**  (0.4526)  (0.6559)** (0.6433)**  (0.4551) 
Observations  225 225 225 225 225 225 
R-squared  0.09 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.02 
H0: Equal Frequent Auth & 
Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
    0.99  0.95  0.94 
H0: Equal Sometimes Auth 
& Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
    0.49  0.28  0.59 
H0: Both sets equal (p-val)      0.78  0.55  0.86 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   23
Table 3: Web Viewing and Television Viewing in the 2006-07 Season 
























Freq'ly on Web -’06-’07  -0.0961  -0.2834  0.1873       
  (0.0907)  (0.0826)**  (0.0617)**     
Sometimes on Web – ’06-’07  0.4751  0.2633  0.2118       
  (0.0829)** (0.0755)** (0.0564)**       
Freq'ly Unauth'd '06-'07        -0.2567  -0.4239  0.1672 
      (0.1360)  (0.1237)**  (0.0936) 
Freq'ly  Auth'd  '06-'07      0.0731  -0.1276  0.2006 
      (0.1206)  (0.1097)  (0.0830)* 
Sometimes Unauth'd '06-'07        0.2717  0.0505  0.2213 
      (0.1422)  (0.1293)  (0.0979)* 
Sometimes Auth'd '06-'07        0.6250  0.4221  0.2029 
      (0.1238)**  (0.1126)**  (0.0852)* 
male  0.2044 0.2832 -0.0788 0.4341 0.5035 -0.0695 
  (0.2581) (0.2352) (0.1756) (0.2728) (0.2482)* (0.1878) 
age  0.0572 0.0283 0.0289 0.0465 0.0177 0.0287 
  (0.0348) (0.0317) (0.0237) (0.0348) (0.0317) (0.0240) 
Constant  0.9015 0.7515 0.1500 1.0180 0.8644 0.1535 
  (0.7623) (0.6945) (0.5188) (0.7579) (0.6894) (0.5217) 
Observations  267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared  0.12 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.09 
H0: Equal Frequent Auth & 
Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
    0.07  0.07  0.78 
H0: Equal Sometimes Auth 
& Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
    0.09  0.05  0.90 
H0: Both sets equal (p-val)      0.05  0.03  0.96 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   24
Table 4: Changes in Web Viewing and Television Viewing between Seasons 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change in Number of Series 
Viewed… 




























Freq'ly on Web  -0.0394  -0.3127  0.2733       
 (0.0889)  (0.0792)**  (0.0721)**       
Sometimes on Web  0.1676  -0.0167  0.1843       
 (0.0861)  (0.0767)  (0.0699)**       
Freq'ly on Web at Unauthorized 
Sites 
     -0.0654  -0.3727  0.3073 
       (0.1378)  (0.1229)**  (0.1114)** 
Freq'ly on Web at Authorized 
Sites 
     -0.0113  -0.2786  0.2673 
       (0.1101)  (0.0982)**  (0.0890)** 
Sometimes at Unauthorized Sites        0.0244  0.0065  0.0179 
       (0.1537)  (0.1371)  (0.1243) 
Sometimes at Authorized Sites        0.2665  -0.0364  0.3029 
       (0.1240)*  (0.1107)  (0.1003)** 
Constant 0.2398  0.1388  0.1009  0.2290  0.1400  0.0890 
 (0.1433)  (0.1276)  (0.1163)  (0.1439)  (0.1284)  (0.1163) 
Observations 223  223  223  223  223  223 
R-squared 0.02  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.07  0.10 
H0: Equal Frequent Auth & 
Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
     0.75  0.53  0.77 
H0: Equal Sometimes Auth & 
Unauth Coeffs (p-val) 
     0.26  0.82  0.10 
H0: Both sets equal (p-val)        0.52  0.80  0.25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  25
Table 5: Translating Viewing Frequency Into Weekly Hours 




















TV Series Watched Freq'ly '06-'07  1.4188  1.4000         
 (0.1249)**  (0.2660)**         
TV Series Watched Sometimes 
'06-'07 
0.4852 0.5000         
 (0.1679)**  (0.2360)*         
Series Watched Freq'ly Auth'd '06-
'07 
   2.1433  0.7500    
     (0.6690)**  (0.2517)**    
Series Watched Sometimes Auth'd 
'06-'07 
   0.6804  -0.0000    
     (0.6757)  (0.1368)     
Series Watched Freq'ly Unauth'd 
'06-'07 
     2.4253  1.0000 
         (0.5686)**  (0.1388)** 
Series Watched Sometimes 
Unauth'd '06-'07 
     1.9007  0.6667 
         (0.6082)**  (0.1844)** 
Constant  1.6135 0.5000 1.9799 1.0000 0.3138 0.0000 
 (0.3901)**  (0.4380)  (0.9846)*  (0.2886)** (0.7543)  (0.0000) 
Observations  264 264 235 235 224 224 
R-squared  0.33  0.05  0.12  
Notes: Odd-numbered columns are linear regressions. Even numbered regressions are median regressions with bootstrapped standard errors.    
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  26
 
Figure 1: YouTube Traffic Rank from Alexa.com 
 
 
Source: http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?q=&url=youtube.com, accessed July 10, 2007.   27
Figure 2   28
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